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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ETHA BAKER FLOWERS, AURA 
BAKER HORTON, and TULlE 
BAKER RA~DALL, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
V!. 
'VRIGHTS, INCORPORATED, a 
corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7445 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to the 11th day of February, 1939, one Allie 
C. Baker was the owner in fee simple of the following 
described premises situate in Ogden City, Weber County, 
State of Utah : 
The store building and ground known as 2341 
Washington Avenue, Ogden, Utah, with lot extend-
ing to Kiesel Avenue and described as follows: 
1 
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Beginning 22 feet South from the Northeast 
corner of Lot 9, Block 32, Plat ''A'', Ogden City 
Survey, and running thence South 22 feet; thence 
West 330 feet ; thence North 22 feet; thence East 
330 feet to the place of beginning, subject to right 
of way over the West 25 feet now used as Kiesel 
Avenue. 
On or about the 11th day of February, 1939, the 
said Allie C. Baker and the defendant entered into, 
executed, and delivered a certain agreement of lease, 
wherein and whereby the said Allie C. Baker, as lessor, 
did lease unto the defendant, as lessee, the above de-
scribed premises for a term of five years commencing 
on the 15th day of February, 1939, and ending on the 
15th day of February, 1944. (R.:OOO, 011, 019.) The 
agreement of lease was introduced in evidence pursuant 
to pre-trial order dated November 14, 1949 (R-019) 
and is designated herein as plaintiffs' "EXHIBIT A." 
The said agreement contains the following !paragraphs 
of critical importance in this action: 
''And said lessee, in consideration of the leas-
ing of the premises aforesaid by the said lessor 
to it, covenants to pay as the annual rental for 
said premises three (3) per cent of the total sales 
volume of the lessee, provided,.however, that the 
lessee agrees to pay a minimum rental of Two 
thousand, nine hundred and forty Dollars ($2,-
940.00) per year, payable in monthly installments 
of Two hundred and forty-five Dollars ($245.00) 
each, monthly in advance on the 15th day of each 
and every month, commencing with the 15th day 
of February, 1939. '' 
"It is understood and agreed that the books of 
said lessee will be open for inspection to verify 
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·the annual sales volume reported by it.'' 
"And the lessee hereby covenants as follows: 
"That neither the lessee nor its legal repre-
sentative will let or underlet said premises, or 
assign this lease, without the written assent of 
the lessor first had and obtained thereto, except 
that said lessee may sublet space in the said 
premises to departments selling other lines of 
merchandise than those offered for sale by the 
lessee, that is to say, women's coats, suits, furs 
and dresses. * * * '' 
"It is further mutually understood and agreed 
by and between the parties hereto that the lessee 
may have the option of extending this lease for 
an additional period of five years, upon terms and 
conditions to be stipulated at that time by the 
lessor and the lessee." ( R-006, 007.) 
On or about the 25th day of June, 1941, Allie C. 
Baker and the defendant entered into, executed, and 
delivered an agreement of extension of lease, which 
was introducd in evide.nce pursuant to pre-trial order, 
and is known and designated herein as plaintiffs' ''EX-
HIBIT B.'' By said agreement of extension of lease, 
the agreement of lease, Exhibit A, was extended for a 
period of 5 years from February 15, 1944 (the termina-
tion date of the original term), to February 15, 1949. The 
{jxtension agreement provided as follows: 
'' * * * it is agreed by and between Lessor 
and Lessee that said Lease of said premises be 
and the same is hereby extended for said addi-
tional period of five years, so tha.t the sawe will 
('xpire on February 15, 1949, provided, however, 
that the same terms, conditions, covenants and 
agreements, including the payment of the same 
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rrwnthly rent as said lease provided shall continue 
with like effect to all legal intents and purposes 
as if contained in new lese, except that the Lessee 
agrees that if during such extended period the 
annual general taxes levied by and !payable to 
Weber County, State of Utah, are increased in 
any year of such extended period over what said 
taxes are now, then the Lessee agrees to pay such 
increase as and when the same a:re payable, and 
such payment shall be construed to be additional 
rental for the period of any such year.'' (R-009, 
010.) 
The defendant occupied and used the leased prem-
ises for a period of ten years, commencing February 15, 
1939, and terminating February 15, 1949. (R-001, 011.) 
During the original term created by Exhibit A and the 
extended term created by Exhibit B, a retail merchandis-
ing store was conducted on said premises by the defend-
ant. During defendant's occupancy of the premises, 
there was sold therefrom women's wearing apparel, 
including women's coats, suits, furs, dresses, shoes, 
and hats. (Pre-trial order; R-002, 011, 020, 021.) 
Subsequent to the execution and delivery of the 
aforesaid agreement of lease, Exhibit A, and the afore-
said extension agreement of lease, Exhibit B, the said 
Allie C. Baker conveyed by warranty deed the above 
described premises unto plaintiffs, subject, however, to 
the occupancy by defendant of said premises under the 
aforesaid agreements; and subject, also, to the terms, 
conditions, covenants, and stipulations of said agree-
ments, and each of them. (R-001, 011.) 
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The said Allie C. Baker died on the 31st day of 
:Jiarch, 1945, intestate, leaving as her sole heirs-at-law 
the plaintiffs herein, who are the daughters of said 
decedent. Said plaintiffs, under the statutes of descent 
and succession of the State of Utah, and particularly 
under the mandates of Section 104-4-5, Utah Code, 1943, 
succeeded to all of the right, title, claim and interest 
of the said Allie C. Baker, deceased, in and to the 
above described leased premises, and in and to the 
rights, interests, and property of the said Allie C. 
Baker, as lessor, in and to said agreement of lease, 
Exhibit A, and in and to said agreement of extension 
of lease, Exhibit B. Plaintiffs are now the owners in 
fee simple of the above described leased premises, and 
the absolute owners of all of the rights, titles, claims, 
and interests of the said Allie C. Baker, deceased, 
created by and existing under the aforesaid agreements, 
Exhibits A -and B, and each of them. (R-001, 002, 011.) 
The defendant attorned to and recognized the plain-
tiffs as the owners ·of the above described leased prem-
ises and all of the rights, interest, and property of 
the said Allie C. Baker, deceased, created and existing 
under the aforesaid agreements, Exhibits A and B. 
(R-002, 011.) 
Pursuant to stipulation of counsel and the pre-trial 
order entered herein (R-019, 022), it was agreed that 
the volume of sales made by defendant from the prem-
ises under lease to it for each of the years from Febru-
ary 15, 1939, to February 15, 1949, was as follows: 
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"For the period from February 15, 
1939, to December 31, 1939 ______________ $ 43,952.12 
For the period from January 1, 
1940 to December 31, 1940________________ 57,044.05 
For the period from January 1, 
1941, to December 31, 194L_____________ 75,984.43 
For the period January 1, 1942, 
to December 31, 1942________________________ 123,550.52 
For the period January 1, 1943, 
to December 31, 1943________________________ 177,184.01 
For the period January 1, 1944, 
to December 31, 1944------------------------ 180,134.12 
·For the period January 1, 1945, 
to December 31, 1945------------------------ 188,732.61 
For the period January 1, 1946, 
to December 31, 1946________________________ 146,619.52 
For the period January 1, 1947, 
to December 31, 194 7------------------------ 142,655.38 
For the period January 1, 1948, 
to December 31, 1948________________________ 149,843.28 
For the period January 1, 1949, 
to February 15, 1949·----------------------- 15,226.53 
. TotaL ...................... $1,300,926.57'' 
(R-020.) 
It was further stivulated and agreed by counsel 
and confirmed by the pre-trial order that the total sales 
made and effected by the sublessee of the shoe depart-
ment for each of the years from February 15, 1939, to 
February 15, 1949, were as follows : 
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''~I arch 25, 1939, to December 31, 1939 ...... $ 9,298.90 
January 1, 1940, to December 31, 1940.... 9,089.26 
January 1, 1941, to December 31, 1941.... 28,272.51 
January 1, 1942, to December 31, 1942.... 60,869.26 
January 1, 1943, to December 31, 1943.... 75,733.46 
January 1, 1944, to Decen1ber 31, 1944____ 99,103.00 
January 1, 1945, to December 31, 1945.... 105,240.42 
January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946 .... 134,038.77 
January 1, 1947, to December 31, 1947 .... 132,874.74 
January 1, 1948, to December 31, 1948.... 153,339.59 
January 1, 1949, to February 15, 1949____ 14,760.18 
TotaL ______________________ $822,620.09'' 
(R-020.) 
It was further stipulated and agreed by counsel 
and confirmed by the pre-trial order that the total sales 
made and effected by the sublessee of the millinery 
department for each of the years from February 15, 
1939, to February 15, 1949, \vere as follows: 
''February 15, 1939, to December 31, 1939 $ 
January 1, 1940, to December 31, 1940 ___ _ 
Jan nary 1, 1941, to December 31, 1941. ... 
January 1, 1942, to December 31, 1942 ___ _ 
January 1, 1943, to December 31, 1943 ___ _ 
January 1, 1944, to December 31, 1944 ... . 
January 1, 1945, to December 31, 1945 ... . 
January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946 ___ _ 
January 1, 1947, to December 31, 1947 .... 
January 1, 1948, to December 31, 1948_ __ _ 
January 1, 1949, to February 15, 1949 ___ _ 
7,288.66 
7,525.23 
9,682.79 
14,555.59 
21,091.91 
18,609.90 
14.804.97 
12,845.24 
12,532.87 
11,535.95 
857.62 
TotaL----------------------$131,330. 73'' 
(R-021.) 
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It was further stipulated and agreed by counsel 
and confirmed by the pre-trial order that the defendant 
paid unto plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest the 
following amounts: 
'' (a) The sum of $29,400.00 as the basic 
rental for the 1period commencing 
February 15, 1939, to February 15, 
1949, at the rate of $245.00 per 
month ------------------------------------------------------$29,400.00 
(b) The sum of $3,997.08 on May 21, 
1945, as additional percentage 
rental due for the period commenc-
ing February 15, 1939, and ending 
ending December 31, 1944____________________ 3,997.08 
(c) The sum of $2,721.97 on January 
14, 1946, as additional percentage 
rental due for the year 1945________________ 2,721.97 
(d) The sum of $1,358.59 on February 
17, 1947, as additional percentage 
rental due for the year 1946________________ 1,358.59 
(e) The sum of $1,341.70 on January 
27, 1948, as additional percentage 
rental due for the year 1947________________ 1,341.70 
(f) The sum of $1,555.30 on January 
31, 1949, as additional percentage 
· rental due for the year 1948________________ 1,555.30 
(g) Total payments made by defendant 
to plaintiffs and their predecessor 
in interest --------------------------------------------.. $40,37 4.64'' 
''That in addition to said payments defendant 
on or about April 11, 1949, tendered to plaintiffs 
the sum of Two Hundred Eleven and 80/100 
($211.80) Dollars as.the balance of rentals due for 
the 1period commencing January 1, 1949, and 
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ending February 15, 1949, which payment plain-
tiffs refused to accept.'' (R-021.) 
The retail sales for the ten-year period made from 
the demised premises totaled as follows : 
Coats, suits, furs, and dresses ________________ $1,300,926.57 
(R-020.) 
Shoes ------------------------------------------------------------ 822,620.09 
(R-020.) 
Hats -------------------------------------------------------------- 131,330.73 
(R-021.) 
TotaL _______________________ $2,254,877 .39 
The plaintiffs allege and claim that they were en-
titled to receive as rental three (3) per cent of the total 
sales aforesaid, or the sum of $67,646.32. The original 
agreement and sublease provided for a minimum ren-
tal of $245.00 per month, or $2,940.00 per year. In the 
year 1939, three (3) per cent of the sales of merchandise 
from said premises was $1,816.19. The basic rental for 
that year (10¥2 months) was $2,695.00. The defendant, 
therefore, became liable under the terms of the lease, 
according to plaintiff's claim, for the difference between 
said basic rental of $2,695.00 and the percentage rental 
of $1,816.19, or the sum of $878.81. 
For the year 1940, the percentage rental computed 
on sales merchandise from the said premises amounted 
to $2,209.76. The difference between the basic rental of 
$2,940.00 (12 months) for said year and the percentage 
rental is the sum of $730.24, for which the defendant, 
according to plaintiffs' claim, is liable. 
9 
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Plaintiffs assert, therefore, that there accrued in 
favor of them under said agreement of lease and exten-
sion agreement the following amounts: 
Three (3) per cent of the total sales 
volume for the 10-year period ________________ $67,646.32 
Balance 1939 minimum rentaL______________________ 878.81 
Balanc"e 1940 minimum rentaL____________________ 730.24 
Total rental due----------------------------------------$69,255.37 
Payment was made by defendant of. ___________ $40,374.64 
Balance due plain tiffs ______________________________ $28,880. 73 
for which judgement was prayed. 
In the course of the operation of the retail merchan-
dising business conducted on the demised premises, the 
defendant sublet space therein to persons, who, there-
after, respectively carried on the business of selling 
shoes and women's millinery. (R-013.) The defendant 
did not account to the plaintiffs, nor to their predecessor, 
for any sales of shoes and millinery made on the demised 
premises, and has contended that said sales were not of 
a nature as to be included in its gross sales volume for 
the purpose of computing percentage rental due plain-
tiffs under their lease agreement. (R-013, 014.) The 
plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the said sales 
of shoes and hats constituded part of the sales volume 
of defendant,· and that it was its duty to account to 
plaintiffs and their predecessor, and to pay the required 
percentage rental thereon. 
At the trial, the plaintiffs made tender of proof 
thro.ugh a witness, then on the stand, (R-047) of the 
10 
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following nature: The defendant, during the ten year~ 
covered by the lease and extension agreement, treated 
the sales made in the hat department and in the shoe 
departrnent as its own sales, inasmuch as all cash sales 
\vere .paid to, and were taken into, the accounts of de-
fendant. (R-047.) All credit sales made by these depart-
ments were taken into and absorbed by the defendant, 
and the debtors, or purchasers, were billed by the defen-
dant. (R-048.) The defendant assumed all credit risks 
in connection with credit sales of hats and shoes, and 
the operators of the hat and shoe departrnents did not 
assume such risk. (R-048.) The settlements made by the 
defendant and the operators of these two departments 
were made on the basis of the gross sales, on a percent-
age basis including credit sales, without respect as to 
the collectibility ... A.ny losses sustained on those accounts 
were losses sustained by the defendant. (R-048.) In 
the treatment of the employees of the shoe department, 
particularly under the arrangement with a certain Mr. 
Ber1 A. Rich, these employees were car-ried on the pay-
rolls of defendant. When the Federal withholding 
tax law came into operation, the defendant with-
held the income tax on these employees' pay and remit-
ted the withheld tax to the United States Collector of 
Internal Revenue. (R-048.) Defendant 1paid the Work-
men's Compensation premium on the employees of the 
~hoe department. (R-048.) It withheld and remitted the 
Old Age Benefit tax from the pay of the employees of 
shoe department, and it also paid the employer's Old 
Age Benefit tax upon said employees' pay. (R-048.) 
11 
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Likewise, the defendant paid the Utah Unemployment 
Insurance tax on the pay of these employees. The court 
sustained the objection of defendant to this evidence 
and refused to allow plaintiffs to make proof of the 
foregoing facts. (&-049.) 
Also, at the trial, the plaintiffs introduced in evi-
dence (R-038) a letter dated June 16, 1941, addressed 
to plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, Mrs. Allie C. 
Baker, and signed by Mr. C. Angus Wright, president 
of defendant. (Plaintiffs' exhibit C.) Said letter reads 
as follows: 
''Agreeable with our conversation of a few 
days ago I have had Judge Howell prepare a lease 
extension as per our conversation, and I enclose 
herewith a copy of the same which you may 
retain for your personal file. The original is in 
Judge Howell's office where you may execute 
it and where the notary can notarize all of our 
signatures. 
''Upon execution of this lease extension we 
will proceed with the plans for rather extensive 
improvements the cost of which we will be willing 
to pay. 
''Kind personal regards.'' 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case 1n chief, the 
defendant moved the Court for judgment of non-suit 
and dismissal upon the following grounds: . 
'' 1. That plaintiffs' complaint, constructed 
(sic) in the light of the stipulation of facts 
embodied in the pre-trial order, does not state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
"2. That no evidence has been introduced 
herein that shows, or tends to show, that defeend-
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ant is indebted to plaintiffs in any sum \Vhatso-
eYer. save and except the sum of $211.80, which 
amount defendant has heretofore tendered plain-
tiffs, and plaintiffs have refused, and which 
amount defendant here and now again tenders 
to plaintiffs. 
''On the contrary, the testimony conclusively 
shmYs that defendant's obligation to plaintiffs 
was, and is, for the payment of rentals based on 
sales by it as .provided in the lease; and, save 
and except for said sum of $211.80, the defendant 
has paid to plaintiffs, or their predecessor in 
interest, all rentals payable under said lease.'' 
(R-050.) 
The Court granted said rnotion and, thereupon, there 
was signed, entered and filed on the lOth day of Decem-
ber, 1949, judgment of non-suit and dismissal of this 
. action. (R-024, 025.) The plaintiffs, in due course, 
perfected their appeal from said judgment to the 
Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED 
FEBRUARY 11, 1939, AND THE AGREEMENT OF EX-
TENSION OF LEASE DATED JUNE 25, 1941, IMPOSED 
UPON THE DEFENDANT THE DUTY OF ACCOUNTING 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR ITS TOTAL SALES VOLUME 
DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE AS EXTENDED, 
AND TO PAY TO PLAINTIFFS AS RENTAL FOR THE 
LEASED PREMISES THREE (3) PER CENT OF SAID 
TOTAL SALES VOLUME. 
A. The total sales volume of defendant during the term 
of the lease as extended included not only the sales 
of women's coats, suit, furs, and dresses, but, also 
the sales of hats and shoes. 
13 
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B. Tbe trial court committed error in dismissing plain-
tiffs' complaint and entering judgment of non-suit 
because the original agreement of lease and agree-
ment of extension of lease, when correctly construed 
and int·erpreted, sustain plaintiffs' claim for unpaid 
rental based on a percentage of sales of millinery 
and shoes. 
1. APPLICABE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION 
AND INTERPRETATION. 
2. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LESSOR AND 
LESSEE AS REVEALED BY THE LEASE. 
3. THE LEASE WAS A CREATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT AND SHOULD BE CON-
STRUED STRICTLY AGAINST IT. 
4. SUBLEASING AUTHORITY CONTAINED 
IN A LEASE MUST NOT BE USED BY 
THE LESSEE AS AN INSTRUMENT TO 
REDUCE RENTALS PAYABLE TO THE 
LESSOR. 
5. TOTAL SALES VOLUME OF THE LES-
SEE. 
6. SPACE AND DEPARTMENTAL OPERA-
TIONS IN RETAIL STORES. 
Succinctly stated, plaintiffs' claim for additional 
rentals under Exhibits A and B (For convenience Ex-
hibits A and B will hereafter be designated "LEASE.") 
is based upon the contention that the sales~ made during 
the term of the orginal lease and extended term thereof 
by the shoe and hat departments operated on the 
leased premises, were part of the total sales volume of 
defendant. Reference is made to the provisions of Ex-
hibit A, S'pecifically quoted above. It is about these 
14 
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prov1s1ons that this controversy revolves. Differences 
arose between the plaintiffs and defendant as to the 
meaning of the phrase "* * * to pay as the annual rental 
for said premises three (3) per cent of the total sales 
Yolume of the lessee,'' and the paragraph of the orginal 
lease, prohibiting the assignment of the lease, or the 
letting or under-letting of said premises, without the 
written assent of lessor first had and obtained thereto, 
''except that said lessee may sublet space in the said 
premises to departments selling other lines of merchan-
dise than those offered for sale by the lessee; that is to 
say, women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses.'' 
It is, therefore, manifest that the decision in this 
case will largely depend upon the construction and inter-
pretation given these provisions of the lease. 
1. Applicable rules of construction and interpretation. 
In determining the correct meaning of the disputed 
phrases and provisions of the lease, there are certain 
rules for construction and interpretation of contracts 
which are not only helpful, but, also, of pertinent rele-
vance. The rules, as exemplified in the following quo-
tations, are useful as implements of interpr'etation: 
''The whole instrument must be- considered, 
and all its terms looked to to ascertain the true 
intent of the parties, and when this intent can 
be ascertained it must prevail, although it may 
be contrary to the strict letter of the contract. 
This rule is elementary* * * " (/XL Furniture 
and Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 52 Utah 
454, 91 Pac. 279.) 
"However, the duty of the courts in interpret-
ing leases and other written instruments, is to get 
15 
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the real intentions of the parties, and in so doing 
the court considers the writing, and, also, the 
circumstances of the parties. * * * When pos-
sible the court should give effect to all words 
and clauses of the lease and construe the lease 
as a whole." (Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 
103 Utah 441, 135 Pac. ( 2d) 906.) 
''A lease must be construed as a whole, and 
whether an ambiguity is patent or latent, the 
intentions of the parties is to be ascertained from 
a consideration of the entire instrument, and 
not from particular part or parts. Particular 
clauses and terms must be considered in connec-
tion with the rest of the lease; and the absence 
of material provisions must be considered. All 
clauses, terms and provisions of the instrument, 
and every word in it, should be construed together 
and given effect, if this may be done consistently 
with rules of law and the intentions of the par-
ties." ( 31 C .. J. 8., Evidence Sec. 231e, pp. 852-
853.) 
''There is still another element to which the 
courts, under certain circumstances, have re-
course, in case the language in a contract is 
ambiguous or uncertain, which is: that where 
one of the parties, or one who is directly inter-
ested in the subject matter of the contract, has 
prepared it and has used language which is 
ambiguous or uncertain in its meaning, the lan-
guage will be construed most strongly against the 
party who has used the ambiguous and uncertain 
language. * * * Although the rule just stated 
is not one of controlling influence, yet, when 
the evidence, as in this case, shows that a lawyer, 
who is an interested party, prepared the contract 
for the defendants, who are laymen, the rule has 
special application." (Emphasis supplied.) (Penn 
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8tar lllining Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 Pac. 
107.) (See also: Read v. Forced Underfin.ug 
Corp., 82 Utah 529, 26 Pac. (2d) 325; Jordan v. 
Jladsen, 69 Utah 112, 252 Pac. 570.) 
''The lease must be construed as a whole, and 
such a construction placed upon it as will render 
all clauses harmonious and consistent. Different 
provisions dealing with the same subject matter 
are to be read together and, where possible, all 
language used should be given a reasonable 
meaning. The intention of the parties is to be 
ascertained from a consideration of the entire 
instrument. Every covenant is to be expounded 
with regard to its context. (3 Thompson on Real 
Property (Perm. Ed.) Sec. 1112, p. 115.) 
''Leases are to be construed as are other con-
tracts, and so far as uncertainties are concerned, 
according to the nature of the specific obligation 
under consideration. The code sections already 
referred to are all sufficient for the purposes 
of the present case. Executory contracts are, as 
a rule, specific, reciprocal, executory obligations. 
In a lease, uncertainty as to the obligations of 
the landlord, or as to those of the tenant, may 
result from erroneous or incomplete expressions. 
While it is to be borne in mind that the intentions 
of the ;parties are to be ascertained from a con-
sideration of the entire instrument, it is never-
theless true that the nature of each covenant 
must be examined when it is necessary to know 
which party is the promissor or obligor there-
under. Such a one may be found to be the 
lessee * * * where the original rental obligation 
was involved, or it may be the lessor * * * where 
questions were involved as to the length of the 
terms of the leases." (Earl Ranch Co., Ltd .. v. 
Marchus, 60 C. A. (2d) Cal.) 379, 140 Pac. (2d) 
891.) 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
''A lease will be given a reasonable construc-
tion where that is possible rather than an unrea-
sonable one. The court will likewise endeavor 
to give a construction most equitable to the 
parties, and which will not give one of them an 
unfair or unreasonable advantage over the other. 
A construction leading to an absurd, harsh, 
or unreasonable result should be avoided if pos-
sible." ( 31 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 231d, p. 852.} 
''Where a question of rent is involved, any 
ambiguity in such covenant as this ought to be 
resolved against the tenant, on the theory that 
rent is a normal and natural incident to occu-
pancy* * *." (Reporting Corporation v. Deshere, 
4 N.J. Miscel. 65, 131 Atlantic 635.) (See also: 
52 C. J. S., Evide'nce, Sec~ 466b, P~ 208.) 
There is no uncertainty as to these rules of inter-
pretation; the problem always arises in applying them, 
and such problem exists in the instant case. 
2. The relationship of lessor and lessee as revealed by 
the lease. 
The lease, on its face, is informatory of the relation-
ship between the parties thereto at the time the !premises 
were leased by Mrs. Baker, the plaintiffs' predecessor in 
interest, to the defendant. Mrs. Baker was the owner 
of real property located in the heart of the retail shop-
ping district (2341 Washington Avenue), in Ogden, 
Utah .. Upon it was erected a store building suitable for 
retail merchandising. The lease covered the real estate 
and improvements. It was, therefore, not a mere con-
tract of occupancy of the building, but created a definite 
- term of years. (32 Am. Jur. - Landlord and Tenant -
Sec. 61, 62; pp. 77, 78.) The lessee, therefore, became 
18 
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the owner of a leasehold interest in real property, and 
}.Irs. Baker held the reversionary interest therein. 
(Ibid.) Plaintiffs, by conveyance and operation of the 
law of succession and descent, succeeded to Mrs. Baker's 
mvnershi,p, interests, and rights. 
As consideration for the lessor leasing the premises 
to it, the defendant agreed to pay an annual rental of 
three (3) per ce:at of its total sales volume, and further 
agreed to pay a 1ninin1um rental of $2,940.00 per year, 
payable in installments of $245.00 each, monthly in ad-
vance, on the 15th day of each and every month com-
mencing with the 15th day of February, 1939. This 
rental covenant is of most important concern in deter-
mining the intentions of the parties to the lease. 
The defendant agreed to pay as rental three (3) per 
cent of its total sales volume, with a subsidiary guaranty 
that under all ·circumstances it would he liable for a 
Elinimum rental of $2,940.00 per year. The requirement 
of minimum rental was, therefore, a ''floor'', which 
guaranteed the lessor this minimum. compensation for 
the use by defendant of the lessor's real estate, regard-
less of the size or quantum of the sales volume of defen-
dant. This agreement differs from many other ''per-
centage leases" which have exhibited themselves in 
the law reports. Many of the litigated percentage leases 
involved agreements of the lessee whereby it agrees to 
pay the lessor a stated sum ~er month, or year, as rental, 
and then provided that the lessor will be entitled to a 
percentage of the gross sales of the lessee over and 
above a stated amount of sales, which, at the percentage 
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stated, would equal the minimum rental. In the case at 
bar, it is obvious that the rental was to be based upon a 
ercentage of defendant's total volume of sales. This ~ust have been one of the animating motives in leasing 
the premises. As a matter of precaution to protect 
the lessor, a minimum rental was agreed upon by the 
parties, but the lease, on its face, shows that the lease 
was consummated on the basic understanding that the 
lessor would participate in defendant's prosperity. Due 
to the form of this rental covenant, there is a definite 
and specific inference that the !parties did not consider 
the minimum rental prescribed as the fair and reason-
able rental value of the premises. In order to meet 
taxes, upkeep, and other charges upon the leased real 
estate, the lessor demanded a fixed rental, but the par-
ties must have intended that the fair and reasonable 
rental value o.f the property would be dependent upon 
the success of defendant's merchandising venture. This 
feature of the lease cannot be overlooked in the inter-
pretation of the agreement. The lessor, after having 
received a guaranty for a fixed rental which would pay 
the carrying charges on the property, was willing to 
take the risk in securing the true and reasonable rental 
value of the property. She became, therefore, not only 
a lessor, but also occupied a position closely related to 
that of a cestui que trust. . There came into existence a 
quasi-fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs and their 
predecessor in interest and the defendant. 
Percentage leases create a relationship which is 
sui generis. In 35 Mich. Law Review} P. 95, is found the 
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following comment: 
'' * * * The leasing arrangement should not be 
construed to establish any of the standard, well 
recognized legal relations such as the landlord 
and tenant relationship, the licensor-licensee re-
lationship, or the partnership relation. To classi-
fy it under any of these heads is to hold that 
certain rules of law are applicable which defeat 
the function of such agreement. Rather, it seems 
that the relation should be regarded as sui 
generis. So far as general1principles are applic-
able at all, they should be the ordinary principles 
of the law of contract.'' 
The case of Garden Suburbs Golf and Country Club 
v. Pruitt, 24 Southern (2d) 989; 156 Fla. 825; 170 A. L. R. 
1107, contains this pertinent statement: 
''A percentage lease permitting the lessee to 
sublet portions of the premises, or concessions, 
or privileges therein, does not permit the lessee 
to deprive the lessor of a percentage of the gross 
receipts which would accrue from main revenue-
producing facilities. In other words, this sub-
leasing authority cannot be used to reduce the 
percentage rental which would ordinarily accrue 
to the lessor from the revenue-producing facilities 
ordinarily operated by the lessee.'' 
The following statement is taken from the annota-
tion contained in 174 A. L. R~ 1115: 
"Percentage leases are admittedly in the na-
ture of agreements sui generis, and while they 
are generally governed by the rules and law 
applicable to ordinary leases, the peculiar fea-
tures of provisions making rental dependent in 
some way upon a percentage of income from 
business on the leased premises, frequently offer 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
difficult and technical questions of construction. 
• • • The classification of the so-called leasings 
of space in the establishment of a business, such 
as a department store, is difficult, but the cases 
seem in agreement that they are not, in a strict 
legal sense, leases.'' 
While dealing primarily with the relationship be-
tween a department store owner and the lessee of a 
department therein, the case of Man;elle, Inc. v. Sol & 
S. Marcus Co., 274 Mass. 469; 175 N. E. 83; 74 A. L. R. 
1012, considers the relationship established by percent-
age leases as follows: 
''It was not merely or chiefly a lease. It was 
primarily an agreement establishing a commer-
cial relationship of some intimacy, and important 
to both parties. * * * It is obvious * * * that 
their relations must be close and intimate, and 
involve no small degree of mutual confidence 
and harmonious contact. * * * The agreement 
and lease signed by the parties manifestly is 
much more than a lease, in the ordinary signifi-
cance of the word. It is an instrument designed 
to regulate, so far as reasonably possibly might 
be foreseen, the manifold relations and points 
_of possible friction arising out of the inevitable, 
close vhysical situation between the business of 
the plaintiff and the business of the defendant." 
The authorities, therefore, establish that there came 
into existence a relationship of more cogent force than 
that of landlord and tenant which the court should con-
sider in arriving at its decision. The face of the lease, 
without considering any surrounding facts and circum· 
stances, demanded that the defendant exercise the ut-
most good faith in functioning under the lease. Due 
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to the ~ercentage rental arrangement and the defend-
ant's covenant, 
"It is understood and agreed that the books 
of said lessee will be open for inspection to 
verify the annual sales volume reported by it.'' 
(Exhibit A, R-006.) 
the defendant became a quasi trustee, and its operations 
and functioning under the lease are subject to strict and 
critical examinat]on and analysis. It deliberately chose 
to place itself in this position by its :agreement to pay 
t~1e lessor a percentage of i~ total sales volume for the 
use of lessor's property. Appellants submit that, in in-
terpreting the controversial terms of the lease, the 
court should keep constantly before it the fact that the 
defendant, as a quasi trustee, occupied a confidential 
relationship towards the lessor. 
3. The lease was a creation of the defendant and should 
be construed strictly against it. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, heretofore set forth in full, 
shows that the agreement of extension of lease was 
drafted by the counsel for defendant, who was also the 
Secretary of defendant. The original lease, plaintiff's 
Exhibit A, was also executed by Judge Howell, as Sec-
retary of the company. The agreement of extension of 
lease specifically adopted all of the terms, conditions, 
covenants, ~and agreements as contained in the original 
lease, and declared that the same "shall continue with 
like legal effect to all legal intents and purposes as if 
contained in new lease." It is but a fair inference that 
Exhibit A was ~also drafted by the defendant and was 
the creature of defendant. Reference is made to the 
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case of Penn Star Mining Co. Vr Lyman, supra, wherein 
the court affirmed the rule that, where the contract is 
ambiguous or uncertain and it has been prepared by 
one of the parties who used language in it which is 
ambiguous and uncertain in its meaning, the language 
will be construed strictly against the party who used 
ambiguous or uncertain language. The decision empha-
sizes the fact that this rule is particularly applicable 
where it is shown that a lawyer, who is an interested 
party, prepared the contra@t. While plaintiffs recognize 
that such rule is not vositively controlling, it is also 
submitted that it is of peculiar applicability in this 
case. Plaintiff's Exihibit C indicates the confidential 
relationship that existed between the lessor and lessee 
at the time the extension agreement was drafted and 
executed. Attention is invited to the fact that this ex-
tention agreement is dated June 25, 1941, or nearly three 
years before the expiration of the original term of the 
lease, and only a few months in excess of two years 
from the date of the original lease. Under such cir-
cumstances, there is a high degree of justice in applying 
this rule of construction in this case. 
4. Subleasing authority contained in a lease must not 
be used by the lessee as an instrument to reduce rentals 
payable to the lessor. 
The case of G'arden Suburbs Calf and Country Club 
v. Pruitt, cited above, announces a fundamental rule in 
the construction and interpretation of the authority 
sometimes contained in percentage leases which permits 
the lessee to sublease parts of, or space in, the leased 
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premises. This subleasing authority cannot ·be used by 
the lessee to reduce the percentage rental "'hich would 
ordinarily accrue to the lessor from revenue-producing 
facilities ordinarily operated by the lessee. 
A striking exam~ple of the application of this rule 
is found in Cissna Loan Co. v. Barron, 149 Washington 
386; 270 Pac. 1022. In that case the lessor was entitled 
to a monthly rental to be computed on a percentage of 
the gross sales of the ''department store business con-
ducted and maintained'' by the lessee in ''said build-
ing" under lease. The lessee moved two important de-
partments to an adjoining building not owned by the 
lessor. In an action to recover the percentage rental, 
the lessor contended that it was entitled to a percentage 
of the lessee's gross sales, whether made in the leased 
building or in the adjoining building. The lessee denied 
liability on sales made by the departments operating 
in the adjoining building. The court wrote: 
"Appellant [lessee] is conducting one busi-
ness only, that of 'The Fair Department Store', 
and is bound to pay rent for respondent's 
[lessor's] building the agreed percentage of the 
gross sales of the 'said department store business' 
* * * . We are clearly of the opinion that respond-
ent is entitled to receive the agreed percentage 
on the gross sales made from the departments 
located in the McArthur [adjoining] building." 
The lease required payment of a percentage of gross 
sales of the department store business maintained by 
the lessee in "said building." Sales from the depart-
ments in the adjoining building were not in "said build-
ing" under lease. It is obvious that, if the lease had 
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been literally construed, the sales in the adjoining build-
ing would not have been included in the lessee's gross 
sales. However, the court did not approve a course of 
practice by the lessee which had the effect of reducing 
·the lessor's rental "which would ordinarily accrue to 
the lessor from the revenue-.producing facilities ordi-
narily operated by the lessee.'' The case is an affir-
mation of this general principle. 
A most interesting and well-considered decision on 
this point is that of S. P. Dunham & Co. v. 26 East State 
Street Development Co., 134 N.J. Equity 237; 35 Atlan-
tic (2d) 40, 49. Summarized, the facts of this case are: 
A lessor leased to a lessee certain buildings for the 
operation of a department store. The lease contem-
plated that the lessor might not be able to secure an 
outstanding title to one of the several buildings under 
lease, and provision was made in the lease whereby the 
lessor would be relieved of delivery of possession of said 
building in the event of its inability to secure the out-
standing title, with a further provision that the basic 
rental would then be reduced. The lessor did not secure 
the outstanding title and, accordingly, was not able to 
place the lessee in peaceable possession of the building. 
The lessee, however, secured a direct lease from the 
owners of the building and used it in the operation of 
its store. The agreement between the lessor and the 
lessee provided a rental to be 1paid by the lessee to the 
lessor based on a percentage of gross sales made by 
the lessee with a prescribed minimum. The lessor as-
serted the right to a percentage of gross sales made 
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by the lessee from the building it, the lessor, failed 
to provide the lessee, and which the lessee thereafter 
leased directly from the owners. The vital issue in the 
case turned upon the meaning of the provision defining 
gross sales as the ''total gross selling price of all mer-
chandise sold and the selling price of all service ren-
dered on, and/ or from, and/ or in connection with the 
aforesaid department store premises'' contained in the 
lease. The court refused to construe the phrase ''in con-
nection with'' as including sales made from the building 
which lessor could not, and did not, deliver to the lessor. 
But in reaching this conclusion, the court particularly 
declared: 
''The construction of the provisions of the 
lease here eJQpressed is not to be understood to 
condone the removal by the claimant of its most 
lucrative and remunerative departments from the 
demised premises to other premises in the endeav-
or to diminish the rent to which the defendant is 
justly entitled under the covenants of the lease. 
The obligation of the complainant to conduct a 
general department store business in the demised 
premises is implicit throughout the lease. The 
evidence discloses that the complainant has 
moved its toy and domestic departments '"' '"' '"'. 
If the defendant has reason to believe that the 
mobilization of departments by the complainant 
is operating to the financial disadvantage of the 
defendant '"' '"' '"' and, if the parties are unable to 
agree upon an equitable adjustment, I shall, 
upon terms, empower a master to inquire and 
report.'' (Emphasis supplied.) 
The decision in Selber Bros. v. N ewstadt's Shoe 
Stores, 194 La. 654; 194 S. 579, should also be examined. 
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The lessee of a part of a building to be used as a shoe 
store, under a lease fixing a minimum monthly rental 
plus six (6) per cent of the amount of the gross sales 
in excess of the minimum rental, which ~previously had 
been renewed twice upon the same terms, was charged by 
the lessor in a damage action with having wilfully vio-
lated one of the implied obligations of the contract of 
the lease by changing the character of the business from 
that of ·a high-class and fashionable shoe store to that 
of a low order of business conducted under another 
name, consisting of continuous close-out sales, cheap 
brands of shoes, end of the season close-outs, old styles, 
and slo'Y-movers brought in from other stores of the 
lessee. The court, in this case, said that whether the 
lessor, on a percentage lease guaranteeing oa minimum 
rental, has cause for complaint when the business is con-
ducted in such way that it will not produce additional 
rent consisting of :p·ercentages of gross sales, is a matter 
depending largely upon the intention of the parties to 
the contract, as expressed in the contract, construed in 
the light of the circumstances under which it was made. 
In the subsequent appeal, 203 La. 316, 14 S. (2d) 10, 
the court conceded that, if a lessee were unable to obtain 
an extension or renewal from the lessor in advance of 
the expiration date of the last annual lease, it would 
be under no obligation to suffer "a large financial loss, 
if such would result by continuous and regular opera-
tion in the premises until the e~piration of the lease 
merely for the sake of providing the lessor with its 
customary rental.'' The court considered that the evi-
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dence adduced upon the trial of cause did not sustain 
this theory, but, rather, the theory of the lessor, that 
it sustained a loss in addition to the required minimum, 
monthly rentals for the months in question by the acts 
of the lessee in departing from customary methods, in 
conducting seasonal sales, and selling undesirable. 'and 
inappropriate goods at times and under conditions which 
not only did not conform to its previous methods, but 
constituted a departure from good practice in the retail 
shoe business and thereby effected a change in the 
nature of the business, resulting in an unwarranted 
reduction in the rentals for the months the business 
was continued, and that the lessor was entitled to re-
cover such amounts, as well as those resulting from 
the premature abandonment of the premises. 
Mayfair Operating Corp~ v. Bessemer Properties; 
150 Fla. 132; 7 S. (2d) 342, construed provisions in 
the lease of a theater (located in Miami, where busi-
ness is seasonal and the theatre was admittedly closed 
in the summer months in order to maintain a high stand-
ard of entertainment), requiring the lessee to :pay as 
rental a minimum, monthly amount for a five-year term, 
and, in addition thereto, the aount, if any, by which 
ten (10) per cent of its gross revenue should exceed 
the minimum, and requiring the use of the lessee's "best 
efforts to obtain and maintain the highest volume of 
business on the premises.'' The court held that, in the 
absence of a provision permitting it, the lessee was not 
entitled to suspend operation of the theatre during the 
summer when there was little business, notwithstanding 
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the common law rule to the effect ''a tenant has unre-
stricted use of the demised premises, barring waste and 
illegal use, that is to say, his dominion of the demised 
premises for the life of the lease is as absolute as that 
of the owner, and he may use it as he desires." 
The principle announced and affirmed by these 
decisions is of particular cogency in the case at bar. It 
is evident from the face of the lease that the parties 
thereto contemplated that the defendant would operate 
upon the demised premises a ret·ail store, wherein and 
wherefrom was to be sold and, in fact, was sold '' wom-
en's merchandise," that is to say, female wearing 
apparel and all accessories and accouterments. This 
fact was manifestly known to the parties to the lease 
at the time of its execution, because P·aragraph 3, plain-
tiff's Exhibit A, specifically provides : 
"That neither the lessee nor its legal repre-
sentative will let or sublet said premises or assign 
this lease, without the written consent of the 
lessor first had and obtained, except that said 
lessee may sublet space in the said premises to 
departments selling other lines of merchandise 
than those offered for sale by the lessee; that is 
to say, women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
It must first be noted that the lessee was given per-
mission to ''sublet space in the premises.'' (The word 
''space'' is defined by Funk & W agnail's New Standard 
Dictionary as "area; expanse.") The authority to 
''sublet space'' is set ·against the prohibition against 
letting or underletting the "premises." The 'parties 
clearly intended that the defendant could not place a 
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subtenant in the demised premises, whether that sub-
tenant occupied all of the premises or only a part 
thereof. However, the defendant was permitted to allow 
the use of ''space in the store'' for the sale of ''other 
lines of merchandise '' than that particularly specified. 
Clearly, the lease contemplated that the permission to 
allow the use of space by others was not an equivalent 
to subleasing. The thought comes uppermost that the 
permitted arrangement left the defendant in complete 
control and direction of the store and of the business 
conducted thereon; otherwise, the prohibition against 
subleasing would have been rendered futile. The de-
fendant was authorized to allow "space" within the 
store to be used by others if the direction of the store 
and control of the business conducted therein remained 
under the defendant's supervision. This so-called sub-
leasing authority did not permit a splitting off of a 
part, or parts, of defendant's business. It was written 
into the lease for the purpose of .permitting the oper-
ation by others of departments under the defendant's 
control, and not for the purpose of subtracting from 
the operations of defendant conducted on the demised 
premises. If the defendant did not sell millinery and 
shoes at the time plaintiffs' Exhibit A was signed, this 
provision also permitted the defendant to increase the 
size and scope of its business by making •arrangements 
satisfactory to it with others to sell such added lines of 
merchandise. Such operation would increase and not 
decrease the volume of its business. The subletting of 
"space in the said premises to departments" is not the 
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equivalent of the underletting of the premises which 
was definitely prohibited. The subletting of space con-
templated a relationship with the ''space'' lessee other 
than would have prevailed under customary and usual 
subleases. Any other interpretahon or construction of 
this provision tproduces a most incongruous situation. 
If the contention that the subletting clause permits the 
defendant to dismember its business, it is easy to imag-
ine a course of conduct by the defendant which would 
entirely destroy and render nugatory the percentage 
provision of the lease. The defendant could proceed to 
"sublease" space in the store to others and retain for 
itself simply a small cubicle or area where it could con-
duct a small and inferior business for the sale of 
women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses. It could thereby 
minimize its operations so as to simulate and pretend 
the operation of such a business, and at the same time, 
build up the other ''departments selling other lines of 
merchandise'' by giving them all but a small area of 
space. Such interpretation would result in the defendant 
paying the lessor only the minimum prescribed rental 
of $2,940.00 per year, and entirely emasculate the per-
centage provision of the lease. It is submitted that such 
a construction and interpretation of the lease runs 
squarely afoul of the fundamental principle that the 
''subleasing authority cannot be used to reduce the per-
centage rental which would ordinarily accrue to the 
lessor from the revenue-producing facilities ordinarily 
operated by the lessee.' ' , 
Defendant's interpretation of the lease not only 
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violates the rule last above mentioned, but, also, first, 
does violence to the positive covenant of the defendant 
"to pay as the annual rental for said ,premises three (3) 
per cent of the total sales volume of the lessee;" and, 
second, completely nullifies the prohibition against sub-
leasing the demised premises. The rules of construc-
tion clearly teach that it is the duty of the court to apply 
each and every covenant of the lease and not adopt a 
construction th~t will nullify an important covenant 
thereof. As opposed to defendant's theory, as exhibited 
in its answer and in its motion for non-suit and dis-
missal, is the plaintiffs' contention that the authority to 
sublease space in the demised premises was intended 
to allow defendant to operate separate departments 
under its own direction, but did not render such depart-
ments independent from defendant's business. They 
would remain and become part and parcel of defend-
ant's operations, and their sales would be and become 
part of defendant's total sales volume. Such construc-
tion is consistent in that it distinguishes between a 
subletting of the store which would result in independ-
ent store keepers whose sales would not be defendant'~ 
sales (This type of subleasing was prohibited.) and the 
''subleasing'' of ''space'' for department operations, 
the sales of which were defendant's sales. (This type of 
arrangement was permitted.) Plaintiff's construction of 
the contract reconciles all of its parts and produces a 
fair, equitable and consistent whole. 
5. Total sales volume of the lessee. 
The defendant agreed with the lessor: 
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''To pay as the annual rental for said prem-
ises three (3) per cent of the total sales volume of 
the lessee." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Defendant claims that the sales made in the shoe 
and millinery department (R-031) were not part of its 
sales volume. Oppositely, the plaintiffs' cause of action 
is built upon the contention that the sales made by these 
departments were sales made by the defendant and 
were part of its sales volume, upon which plaintiffs are 
entitled to the percentage rental of three (3) per cent. 
There is no dispute over the fact that the defendant did 
not account to .plaintiffs and to their predecessor in 
interest for the sales made in the millinery and shoe 
departments, and that it paid no percentage rental on 
said sales. This law suit finds its existence in plain-
tiffs' contention and in defendant's denial of its cor-
rectness. The critical words of the covenant appear to 
be ''total sales volume of lessee.'' The word ''total'' is 
of particular influence. Webster's New International 
Dictionary, Second Edition, defines ''total'' as : 
''Of, pertaining to or referring to the whole 
of a thing, specified or implied, or the entire num-
ber of things specified or implied, or the entire 
number of things concerned ; not partial, as a 
total eclipse or wreck. Comprising or constituting 
a whole or the sum of all parts, items, instances, 
etc.; entire; as the total amount of revenue, out-
put, disbursements, mileage, or membership.***" 
In the case of Glaze v. Hart et al, 225 Mo. Appeal1205; 
36 S. W. (2d) 684, 688, the following definition of the 
word ''total'' was applied: 
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''The word 'total' is defined as whole; un-
divided, entire; con1plete in degree; utter; 
absolute.'' 
In East Texas Fire Insurance Co. v. Blume et al, 76 
Tex. 653; 13 S. \V. 572, 576, the court said: 
''The word 'total' means 'all, the whole * * *' '' 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Utah in Intermountain 
Title Guaranty Co. v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah 
222; 152 Pac. (2d) /2-1, 726, defined the word "total" 
as follows: 
"[The statute] is 1plain and unambiguous. It 
requires a tax on total premiums. Total is defined 
in \\~ ebster 's New International Dictionary as 
'comprising or constituting a whole; whole; un-
divided; lacking no part; entire; * * * ' '' 
The word "volume'~ is defined by Webster's New 
International Dictionary, Second Edition, as: 
''A mass; bulk; aggregate; often, a consider-
able quantity, as a volume of gas, to increase 
the total volume of sales." 
A careful examination of digests, encyclopedias, and 
the classic ''Words and Phrases,'' fails to reveal where 
the words ''sales volume'' have received judicial inter-
pretation. However, the dictionary definition of the 
words ·are extremely helpful. 
Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, defines 
"sale'' as, "a con tract between two parties, called re-
spectively the 'seller' (or vendor) :and the 'buyer' (or 
purchaser), by which the former, in consideration of the 
payment or promise of payment of a certain price in 
money, transfers to the latter the title and possession 
of property." Black cites Arnold v. North American 
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Chemical Co., 232 Mass. 196, 122 N. E. 283, 284; and 
Faulkner v. Town of South Boston, 141 Va. 517, 127 
S. E. 380, 381, as defining the word '' s:ale '' as a con-
tract whereby property is transferred from one person 
to another for a consideration of value, implying the 
passing of the general and absolute title as distin-
guished from a s1pecial interest falling short of a com-
plete ovvnership. 
· In determining the meaning of the phrase ''total 
sales volume of the lessee,'' it should not be torn from 
the contract, but should be read and considered in con-
nection with the entire lease agreement. It is manifest, 
however, that in using the word "total," the parties 
used an all-inclusive word of broad meaning and por-
tent. The word "volume" is also a word of large and 
all-embracing content. The parties, therefore, used 
words of broad, operative effect. The two words possess 
an all-inclusive quality, without limitations. They were 
used in a lease by the lessor to the lessee of real prop-
erty, intended by the parties to be used in the opera-
tion of the lessee's retail merchandising business. The 
phrase ''total sales volume of the lessee'' has a terrific 
impact upon the contract as a whole .. One is struck by 
its comprehensive, unlimited meaning when applied to 
the basis upon which the rent was to be determined. 
The phrase was used in connection with the rent cove-
nant, and "any a1nbiguity in such covenant * * * ought 
to be resolved against the tenant on the theory that 
rent is a normal and natural incident to occupancy. 
* * *" (Reporting Corporation v. Deshere, supra, and 
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52 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 466b, p. 208, supra.) 
Insofar as the lessor is concerned, but one business 
was to be conducted upon the leased premises, and that 
was the business of the lessee. When the lease speaks 
of "subletting" "space" in the said premises to depart-
ments selling other lines of merchandise, etc., there is 
no declaration in such phrase authorizing the lessee to 
dismember its total business. The departmentalizing of 
lessee's business was an administrative detail of the 
lessee, and was of no concern to the lessor, provided 
there was no violation of the subleasing provision of 
the lease and defendant did not- use the ''space'' pro-
vision as a subterfuge to reduce the ·percentage rental 
payable to plaintiffs. One of the primary reasons for 
this prohibition against subletting the demised premises 
or assigning the lease was to prevent arising the exact 
condition defendant now asserts it had the right to 
produce. The prohibition was intended to prevent inde-
pendent business units on the premises whose sales 
would not be those of the defendant and which would 
make inoperative the percentage provision of the lease. 
"Space" operators were permitted because sales by 
them were part of defendant's sales volume. 
Considering the all-inclusive quality of the phrase 
in question-'' total sales volume of the lessee' '-and 
the fact that the lease on its face emphasizes the lessee's 
responsibility for use and occupancy of the property, the 
permission to'' sublease'''' space'' in the store cannot rea-
sonably be considered as authorizing a process diluting 
the all-embracing covenant to pay percentage rental on 
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the total sales volume. It would, indeed, be a strained 
and unnatural interpretation of both the covenant to 
pay rent and the "space" clause of the contract, to 
affix a meaning to them which would authorize the de-
fendant to destroy, or, at least, render inoperative, the 
percentage rental agreement. The broad :and all-in-
clusive covenant "to pay as the annual rental for said 
premises three (3) per cent of the total sales volume 
of the lessee'' possesses such driving force as to per-
meate the whole agreement, ·and any limitations there-
on should have been definitely and positively set forth. 
The rent covenant should not be weakened by any im-
plications created by other clauses of the contract. 
Attention is invited to the fact that the "space" clause 
is not part of the rental covenant, but is in Paragraph 3 
of the lease (plaintiffs' Exhibit A) and is related to 
the prohibition against subleasing. The defendant's con-
tention virtually requires the court to insert in the 
contract a provision that limits the operation of the 
rental covenant, by providing that the percentage rental 
should not be paid on sales made from the demised 
premises by operators under the "sp!lce" authorization. 
It is submitted that, if the parties intended such proviso, 
it should have been written into the contract in affir-
mative terms, and that the court, under acknowledged 
authorities,· cannot insert it. A consistent and reason-
able intel"pretation of the phrase, "total sales volume 
of the lessee," compels the conclusion that, insofar as 
the lessor was concerned, it incl~ded sales made by 
''space'' operators. 
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6. Space and departmental operations in retail stores. 
The ''space'' clause of the lease contemplated ar-
rangements between the lessee and third persons for 
the use of certain space in the store for the operation 
of departments selling other lines of merchandise than 
that of the lessees. In order to understand the oper-
ative effect of such "space" leasing, it is well to refer 
again to the article in 35 Mich. Law Review, heretofore 
cited. The author of this article made the further, addi-
tional analysis of these leasing arrangements: 
''An important merchandising device, largely 
developed within the last fifteen years, is the 
'leasing' of certain departments by proprietors 
of retail stores to outsiders who agree to operate 
them as integral units of the owner's business. 
It has been estimated that more than sixty per-
cent of the department stores and more than, 
forty-eight percent of specialty stores had leased 
departments in 1930. 
''Any one or more of several reasons may be 
responsible for a particular retailer 'farming out' 
a portion of his business. He may be unable to 
secure the necessary crupital for establishing a 
desired department; he 1nay be unable to obtain 
an adequately trained subordinate to manage the 
proposed line; his business may not warrant, or 
he may be unwilling to assume, the risk of ventur-
ing into a new line whose success is not assured; 
he may be too far from the fashion market which 
dominates the contemplated line, for example 
millinery, to be able himself to anticipate the 
changing demands of the consumer; or the par-
ticular department may not in itself be suffi-
ciently important to justify the store owner's 
devoting to it the time necessary for successful 
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operation, and yet it is a service which customers 
will expect and which can attract them to other 
sections of the store. 
''There has accordingly developed a typical 
arrangement whereby the retail proprietor 
'leases' or 'licenses' one or more particular de-
ipartments of his business to an independent indi-
vidual or firm. 
''The term of the lease may not be expected 
to exceed five years, though renewal provisions 
may make extensions possible. The space is let 
for the express purpose of retailing a carefully 
enumerated line of goods only, with covenant of 
lessee to sell no others and covenant of lessor not 
to compete. Strict provisions against assignment 
by the lessee are almost certainly to be found. 
The rental reserved is usually a percentage of 
the gross sales of the department, generally pay-
able monthly like regular rent and probably with 
a guaranty of an annual minimum. All receipts . 
from sales are generally required to pass through 
a cashier furnished by the store." 
There has arisen a series of most interesting cases 
in defining the relationship of a store owner to depart-
ment operators therein. Below are quoted excerpts froin 
some of the leading opinions on this subject: 
"It is true that the agreement is in a certain 
sense a lease, but it is more than that. It ~provides 
for the carrying on of a joint business. * * * 
There is also a joint possession of certain aisles 
and approaches to the store * * *. It creates 
. such business and fiduciary relations between 
the parties as to be more properly denominated 
a partnership or quasi- partnership agreement 
than a lease." (Milwaukee Boston Store v. J(atz, 
153 vVis. 492; 140 N. W. 1038, 1048.) 
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A contract betwee1i a deparhnent store owner and 
a n1usic publisher gave to the latter "the exclusive li-
cense and privileg-e of selling and dealing in sheet 
music" upon the pre1nises of the store in a location to 
be assigned by the store owner. There was a provision 
against assigning or transferring the ''lease or con-
tract'' by the music dealer and he also covenanted he 
would not sublet the premises. The court held: 
" * * * this contract gives no interest in land. 
It is not a lease, but a license; and the use of 
those terms which are appropriate and common 
in leases cannot change its real nature in. that 
respect. * * * There is nothing in this conclusion 
which is incopsistent with Sutton v. Goodman, 
194 Mass. 389, 80 N. E. 608, upon which the 
defendant relies. That case was decided upon 
:principles peculiar to leases, and is not to be 
taken as affecting the general principles applic-
able to breach of contracts in general. It has 
no application to a case like this." (R. H. White 
Co. v. Remick & Co., 198 Mass. 41; 84 N. E. 113.) 
A jewelry store owner agreed to furnish the plain-
tiff ~a show case and shelving for the purpose of con-
ducting a stationery department in the store for the 
''privilege'' of which plaintiff agreed to pay a :percent-
age of the gross sales. Before the expiration of the 
contract, the store owner removed his business from 
the store and leased it for a dyeing establishment and 
a second hand clothing store. The court ~allowed the 
plaintiff to recover damages based on the value of the 
contract, saying: 
"This agreement did not really create the re-
lation of landlord and tenant between the parties. 
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* * * The agreement created a business arrange-
ment for the benefit of both parties. The counsel 
for the defendant is therefore in error in claim-
ing that the rule of damages to be applied in this 
case is that which would have been proper if the 
relation of landlord and tenant had existed. * * * 
The peculiar nature of this agreement is such 
that the only general rule of damages which 
could be applied was the value of the agreement 
to the plaintiff at the time of its breach." (Dick-
inson v .. Hart, 142 N.Y. 183, 36 N. E. 801.) 
"Without setting forth all the details of all 
of the arrangements and agreement between the 
Arnold Constable Company and the co-partners, 
Little and Noyes, it is evident that it was one of 
the not uncommon modern arrangements for the 
conduct of separate departments in a general 
department store, by turning over an entire de-
partment, like shoes and millinery, to someone 
familiar with that line of business and in whom 
the management has confidence, both as to their 
general business acumen and integrity, retaining 
general oversight of the business, the business 
of the department in question being conducted 
so that to the public it is a part of the general 
store and under its sole management. * * * Such 
arrangements may result in a lease of a part of 
a store, or, even if de signa ted as a lease and the 
parties as lessor and lessee, the agreement may 
he of such a nature that by reason of the trust 
and confidence imposed in the so-called lessee it 
is something more than a lease * * * . '' ( Gerould 
Co. v. Arnold Constable & Co., 65 Fed. (2d; 
C. C. A. 1st Cir.) 444.) 
Reference is also made to the quotation from the deci-
sion in .~.tfarcelle, Inc. v. Sol & 8. Marcus Co., heretofore 
cited, for an interesting analysis of the relationship 
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between the· store owner ·and "space" or departmental 
operator in retail stores. 
The exception written in Paragraph 3 of the origi-
nal lease, plaintiffs' Exhibit A, "that said lessee may 
sublet space in the said premises to departments sell-
ing other lines of merchandise, etc.,'' should be read 
and interpreted against the background of judicial pre-
cedent, of which leading and oft-quoted examples are 
hereinabove cited: The record is silent as to the rela-
tionship between the defendant and the operators of its 
millinery and shoe departments, except as hereinafter 
discussed in Point II of this brief. However, the provi-
sion of the lease must have been written and understood 
by the parties thereto, and particularly the defendant, 
in the light of the "important merchandising device" 
developed in the retail merchandising business, and 
operative at the times both plaintiffs' Exhibits A and 
B were executed. These judicial interpretations of the 
relationship between a store owner and a ''space'' or 
department operator interpret this custom and practice 
of the retail trade in a variety of circumstances, and 
they are of great relevancy in the present discussion. 
The defendant admits that it availed itself of the ~au­
thority contained within the exception in Paragraph 3, 
plaintiffs' Exhibit A, and that millinery and shoes 
were sold by "space" operators during the term and 
extended term of the lease. Regardless of the e~act 
agreements between the defendant and the ''space'' 
operators, it is manifest that the relationship between 
the defendant and the "space" operators must have 
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been well within the ambit of these decisions ; otherwise 
the ''space'' operators would have been the sublessees 
of the demised premises, and such subletting would be 
in violation of the primary 1prohibition of Paragraph 3, 
plaintiffs' Exhibit A. It is not to be supposed that the 
defendant will contend that its arrangements with these 
''space'' operators were of such nature as to constitute 
the operators as sublessees, and thus making the ar-
rangements in violation of the terms of the lease. There-
fore, without any proof de hors the lease, it is evident 
that these arrangements were of the pattern demon-
strated in the foregoing decisions. In the typical cases, 
the ''space'' or departmental operators conducuted their 
operations as a part of the store-owner's establish-
ment and under his sole direction. The decisions 
show that the strict rules of landlord and tenant can~ 
not be applied. Whether the arrangements in this case 
be considered a lease or a license, it is immaterial, 
because, beyond peradventure, the defendant must have 
dominated the operations. The departments were op-
erated as an integral part of the defendant's store and, 
as the court well stated in the Arnold Constable case 
above cited, the defendant retained "general oversight 
of the business, the business of the department in ques-
tion being conducted so that to the public it is a part 
of the general store and under its sole management.'' 
No divorcen1ents of the sales of millinery and shoes 
from the defendant's business occurred so as to con-
stitute the sales of millinery and shoes !as separate and 
independent operations, and make the defendant the 
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landlord and the operators mere tenants. The latter 
arrangement w·ould not only have been in violation of the 
terms of the lease, but, also would have created an intol-
erable situation for the defendant. Without supervision 
and direction of the policies of these departments by the 
defendant, confusion and misunderstanding in the .na-
ture of things would have arisen. There must have 
existed a close relationship between the operators and 
the defendant-so close, in fact, that the sales of mil-
linery and shoes were an integrated part of defendant's 
sales volume. It is submitted that the court, in con-
struing and interpreting the controversial provisions 
of the lease, is entitled to, and should take cognizance 
of, the relationship between the defendant and the de-
partment operators !authorized by the exception per-
mitted in Paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Exhibit A. When 
this is done, it will be quickly seen that this ''space" 
authority did not separate the sales of millinery and 
shoes from the business and sales volume of defendant, 
but was an ·authorization to enable the defendant ad-
ministratively to adjust its operations consistent with 
'vhat it deemed expedient and proper. Such authoriza-
tion did not dilute nor lessen the defendant's sales 
\'olume. 
CONCLUSION 
Considering the face of the lease alone, plaintiffs 
sincerely believe that they have demonstrated that the 
trial court erroneously interpreted and construed the 
same, and that a proper and legal interpretation of the 
lease compels the conclusion that the sales of millinery 
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and shoes were a part of the sales volume of defendant 
and, hence, should have been included in the computa-
tion of percentage rental due plaintiffs and their pre-
decessor in interest. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DE-
NYING TENDER OF EVIDENCE MADE BY PLAIN-
TIFFS AS TO THE MANNER AND METHODS PURSUED 
BY DEFENDANT IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS BUSINESS 
UNDER THE LEASE AND AGREEMENT OF EXTEN-
SION OF LEASE. 
1. Evidence of facts and circumstances surrounding 
the execution and operation of a written agreement 
does not violate the parole evidence rule, and such 
evidence is admissible although th·e agreement is 
unambiguous. 
2. The acts and conduct of a party, when inconsistent 
with his present claims, may be shown in evidence 
against him. Evidence of defendant's method of 
operating millinery and shoe departments were im-
plied admissions that the departments were an 
integrated part, of defendant's business and their 
sales were part of defendant's sales volume. 
At the trial, the plaintiffs made tender of proof of 
certain facts 1pertaining to the methods and manner of 
operations by defendant of the hat and shoe depart-
ments during the term and extended term of the lease. 
(R-047, 048.) Upon the conclusion of the offer, the 
following colloquy occurred between counsel for the 
plaintiffs and the court: 
''THE COURT : Let me ask you this ques-
tion, Mr. Riter. Suppose these lessees had oper-
ated entirely independent, they had no arrange-
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n1ent - say just for the purpose of argument 
here - suppose they had operated entirely in-
dependent, had their own cash register and had 
their own set-up on everything, would you still 
contend their sales came under the terms of the 
lease 1'' 
''A : Yes, I would, under the terms of the 
lease, quite frankly." 
"THE COURT: Then with that I will sustain 
the objection to the evidence if that is your con-
tention.'' 
"A: "\Vhy certainly I contend that." 
"THE COURT: I will sustain the objection." 
(R-049.) 
The plaintiffs co~tended at the trial, and now contend 
on appeal, that the face of the lease, properly and cor-
rectly construed and interpreted, entitled them to the 
percentage rental upon sales of millinery and shoes. 
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' contention in this respect, 
they should have been allowed to submit evidence to the 
court of the manner and methods pursued by defendant 
in operating its business under the lease. Such evidence 
would not violate the parol evidence rule, and there was 
no necessity of establishing an ,ambiguity in the lease 
as a condition precedent for the admissibility of this 
evidence. It was evidence of facts and circumstances 
surrounding the operation of the lease. 
1. Evidence of facts and circumstances surrounding 
the execution and operation of a written agreement does 
not violate the parol evidence rule, and such evidence is 
admissible although the agreement is unambiguous. 
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''Parol evidence is admissible to show what 
was said and done after as well as before the 
execution of the lease in order to indicate what 
was intended by the parties to be included as an 
appurtenance. Such evidence is not received for 
the purpose of varying the terms of the written 
instrument, but of arriving at the intention of 
the parties with reference to the subject matter 
of the lease. Conversations had by appellant 
with the lessor and with respondent, together 
with evidence of circumstances and occurrences 
that will aid the court, may be shown for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether the things claimed 
by the lessee were intended to be included as 
appurtenances." (Von Rohr v~ Neely, (Califor-
nia, 1946), 76 c. A. (2d) 713, 173 Pac. (2d) 828.) 
"Contracts are to be construed in the light' 
of surrounding circumstances; from these alone 
are they tangible to sense !and made susceptible 
of application and improvement. The law which 
imparts to it validity, and which is usually desig-
nated by mere words of description, are to be 
considered in determining the situation of the 
parties, antl in carrying out the contract. These 
are external, and imply, when not otherwise under-
stood, the necessity of resorting to outside proof 
to render the contract intellible and make it ef-
fectual. The introduction of such evidence is no 
violation of the rule we have stated, and no im-
peachment of the written contract, but is in fur-
therance of and necessary ·to its fair and full 
enforcement. * * * Evidence offered not to con-
tradict or vary the terms of a written agreement, 
but simply to explain how it is to be carried out, 
is admissable.'' Wines & Kimball v~ Stevens ct 
Shurtliff, 1 Utah 305; 39 Pac. States Reps. 305.) 
''Of course the rule (the parol evidence rule) 
even as between the parties to the instrument, 
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does not foreclose all parol evidence, but only 
such as would change or vary or contradict the 
terms of the writing, when such terms are clear 
and definite." (Garrett v .. Ellison, 93 Utah 184; 
72 Pac. (2d) 449.) 
''The parol evidence rule does not preclude 
the reception of parol evidence with reference 
to a n1atter evidenced by the writing, where such 
evidence relates to a matter in pais, or is of such 
a character that it does not tend to vary or con-
tradict the written instrument. Thus parol evi-
denc.e which does not vary or contradict the doc-
ument under consideration is admissable to esta-
blish the connection of the document with the 
case, to show matters as to which the instrument 
is silent, to explain how an agreement is to be 
carried out, to show matters required to be shown 
by the -contract, or without which it could not be 
performed, to show the manner in which the con-
tract was performed, and whether there was a 
breach of contract, and to show a particular mode 
of payment or discharge agreed on by the part-
ies." (32 C. J. S. Evidence, Sec. 930.) (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval the 
language used in the case of Ganson v. Madigan, 15 
\Vis. 144: 
"Thus, if the language of the instrument is 
applicable to several persons; to several parcels 
of land, to several species of goods ; to several 
monuments, boundaries or lines ; to several wri-
tings ; or the terms be vague and general, or have 
divers meanings, - in all these and the like 
cases, parol evidence is admissible of any extrin-
sic circumstances tending to show what person 
or persons, or what things, were intended by 
the party, or to ascertain his meaning in any 
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other respect; and this without any infrigement 
of the general rule, which only excludes parol 
evidence of other language declaring the mean-
ing of the parties than that which is contained 
in the instrument itself. * * *" (Bartels v .. Brain, 
13 Utah 162; 44 Pac. 715.) 
"(3) The truth had finally to be recognized 
that words always need interpretation; that the 
process of interpretation inherently and invaria-
bly means the ascertainment of the association 
between words and external objects; and that this 
makes inevitable a free resort to extrinsic matters 
for applying and enforcing the document." (Wig-
'more on Evidence, Vol IX, Sec. 2470.) 
"This rule [parole evidence], however, is lim-
ited in its application to the language of the in-
strument and does not exclude the light of ex-
trinsic circumstances, if necessary, in order to 
understand more perfectly the intent and mean-
ing of the parties. '' ( 20 Am. J ur. Evidence, Sec. 
1143, p. 998.) (See also Annotation 17 L. R. A. 
274.) 
2. The acts and conduct of a party, when inconsistent 
with his present claims, may be shown in evidence against 
him. Evidence of Defendant's methods of operating millin-
ery and shoe departments were implied admissions that 
the departments were an integrated part of defendant's 
business and their sales were part of defendant's sales 
volume. 
"Statements in the nature of admissions are 
admissible against a party to a suit for the pur-
pose usually of establishing the fact to which 
the statements refer. Admissibility is not depen-
dent upon any tendency to discredit or contra-
dict the testimony of a party, although the state-
ments may be so used." ( l\1alia, State Bank 
Com'r, for Use and Benefit of Creditors of North 
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Sanpete Bank v. Seeley, 89 Utah 262; 51· Pac. 
(2d) 357.) 
''Such admissions are competent evidence no 
matter when made. The time, place, and circum-
stance of their n1aking go to the weight, not to the 
competency, of the evidence. Being substantive 
evidence of a fact in issue, the plaintiff was en-
titled to have admitted that distinct class or spe-
cies of eYidence, regardless of whether the origi-
nal transactions with respect to which admissions 
"~ere made were clearly or only slightly sup-
ported." (In re ~Eller's Estate, 31 Utah 415; 88 
Pac. 338.) 
'' .. A.n admission may be express or implied; i. 
e., it may take place in the form of uttered words 
of statement, or in the form of conduct from 
which is inferred a belief that would be repre-
sented by admissory statement. * * * (b) The 
implied admission is reached indirectly, i. e. by 
inference from conduct, i. e. a circumstantial in-
ference from some conduct to the supposed mental 
state of belief beneath it, this mental state when 
defined into words being (more or less loosely) 
inconsistent with the party's claim. * * *" (Wig-
more on Evidence Vol. IV, Sec. 1052.) (Emphasis 
supplied) 
"The statements made out of court by a par-
ty-opponent are universally deemed admissible, 
when offered against him. * * * (b) But when 
offered against the party they have additionally, 
the same logical status as a witness' self-contra-
diction. Just as a witness' testimony is discred-
ited when it appears that on another occasion he 
has made a statement inconsistent with that testi-
mony, so, also the party-opponent is discredited 
when it appears that on some other occasion he 
has ·made a statement inconsistent with his .pres-
51 
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ent claim against him. The witness speaks in 
court through his testimony only, and hence his 
testimony forms the sole basis upon which the 
inconsistency of his other statement is predi-
cated. But the party-opponent, whether he, him-
self, takes the stand or not, speaks always 
through his pleadings and through the testimony 
of his witnesses put forward to support his plead-
ings; hence the basis upon which may be predi-
cated a discrediting inconsistency on his part in-
cludes the whole range of facts asserted in his 
pleadings and in the testimony relied on by him:'' 
(Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IV, Sec. 1048.) 
''Where a 'party on the trial of an action 
advances contentions which are inconsistent with 
his prior conduct with relation to the matter in 
controversy, such prior conduct may be shown 
as being in the nature of an admission." (31 C. 
J. S. Evidence, Sec. 291.) 
''The evidence which the plaintiff adduced as 
to the admissions of the defendant was not ad-
duced nor received to impeach the defendant, 
nor to discredit him, nor merely to affect his cred-
ibility. It was adduced and was received quite 
to the contrary, and as all admissions of a liti-
gant as to a material fact are adduced and re-
ceived, for the purpose of establishing the truth 
of the statements made or the existence of a fact 
to which they relate, and on the theory that what 
a party, as to a matter of fact, has voluntarily 
admitted to be true, may reasonably be taken 
as true, especially as to a rna tter adverse to him, 
for presumptively a party ordinarily does not 
admit as true that which is against him unless 
it is true . .And of such probative effect are admis-
sions of matters of fact of a party generally re-
garded when adverse or disserving and volun-
52 
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tarily made, as to make a prima facie case to the 
extent of the subject-matter of the admission, 
and to dispense with other proof of the fact so 
admitted and is sufficient to support a finding 
of fact resting alone on such extrajudicial ad-
mission of a party. (3 Jones, Comms. on Evi-
dence, Sec. 1072.) Thus, evidence of admissions 
of a party adduced by his adversary in his case 
in chief, and as part of it, is received as sub-
stantive evidence, as primary evidence of the 
fact admitted, and not merely to impreach or dis-
credit the testimony of the declarant.'' (Peter-
son v. Richards, 73 Utah 59; 272 Pac. 229.) 
The facts which the plaintiffs offered to prove 
and which the trial court excluded were evidence of the 
methods and manner in which the millinery and shoe 
departments were operated in defendant's store during 
the term and extended term of the lease. Defendant's 
acts in this connection were inconsistent with its con-
tention 1alleged in its answer and urged upon argument 
of its motion for non-suit and dismissal. These facts 
constituted an implied admission ag~inst interest in a 
matter germane and relevant to this controversy. They 
were material to the issues in the case, and constituted 
evidence of vital value to the plaintiffs. It is submitted 
that the court committed reversible error in denying 
plaintiffs the right to prove these f.acts. 
WHEREFORE, the tplaintiffs submit that the 
judgment in this action should be reversed and that the 
lower court be instructed and directed to grant plain-
tiffs a new trial. 
53 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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LAVAR E. STARK, 
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and Appellants. 
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